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ADDITIVE EFFECTS
Stafford and Gurney (2011) (S&G) dis-
cuss a beautiful set of reaction-time (RT)
data (Figure 1) from an experiment using
the Stroop effect in which they varied
the saturation of the color in which the
word was printed. They found persua-
sive additivity of the substantial effects on
mean RT of two factors: saturation of the
FIGURE 1 | Mean RT data from Stafford et al.
(2011, Experiment 1) and fitted additive model.
Standard errors (SEs) shown (with mean 5.0ms),
which can be used to assess goodness of fit, are
based on deviations from additive models plus
linear interactions fitted to the 15 mean RTs from
each of the 20 subjects. The SE based on the
residual mean square (114 df) in an anova, after
removing the effects of subject, saturation,
congruence, their two-way interactions, and the
interaction with subjects of the linear interaction
of saturation and congruence, is 8.2ms.
color to be named, and congru-
ence of the word with the color
name.
Such additivity is consistent with the
RT being generated by two stages (suc-
cessive processes), C: color discrimina-
tion, whose duration is influenced by
saturation but not congruence, and N:
retrieval and pronunciation of the color
name, whose duration is influenced by
congruence but not saturation. (There
must also be another process, W: word
recognition, in which the word is identi-
fied, which perhaps ends before N and
may operate in parallel with C.) S&G claim
that their findings can also be explained
by a model that contains a single pro-
cess influenced by both factors. Because
they interpret the additive factors method
(AFM; Sternberg, 1969, 1984, 1998, 2001,
2011) to be associated with the idea that
the additivity of the effects of two fac-
tors implies two stages, they conclude
that the assumptions of the AFM are
“untenable.”
INFERENCE FROM ADDITIVITY
I believe that such additivity supports
(increases belief in) a two-part hypothesis:
processes organized serially (stages)
together with selective influence of the
factors on those stages, but doesn’t imply
that hypothesis (Sternberg, 2001, Table
3). If more than one model is consistent
with some properties of a set of data, then
selecting among models often requires a
search for predictions of other properties
that distinguish them, sometimes supple-
mented by further experiments and/or
plausibility considerations. Examples
are provided by Roberts and Sternberg
(1993), who considered five data sets in
relation to stage models together with
two other models that can explain addi-
tive effects on mean RT: an “alternate
pathways model” and a version of the cas-
cade model (McClelland, 1979; Ashby,
1982). By assuming stochastic indepen-
dence of stage durations to strengthen
the stage models, and considering prop-
erties that depend on RT variance, they
could discriminate among the alterna-
tives. See also Schweickert et al. (2012,
Ch. 6).
IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE
MODELS
Since the AFM was introduced (Sternberg,
1969), alternatives to stage models
have been developed that are consis-
tent with means additivity (Ashby, 1982;
Roberts and Sternberg, 1993; Miller et
al., 1995). However, in all such mod-
els thus far, the prediction of additivity
derives from functionally distinct pro-
cessses plus selective influence. Thus,
the existence of these alternatives does
not weaken the support provided by
additivity for functionally distinct and
separately modifiable processes, but does
weaken support for those processes being
organized as stages. However, S&G’s
single-process model has not been shown
to produce additive effects, and seems
implausible.
ARE EFFECTS ADDITIVE IN S&G’s
“ONE-STAGE”MODEL?
S&G made no attempt to fit models
to their data. Even without the con-
straints this might impose, saturation
and congruence interact systematically
in their simulation of the single-process
model (S&G figure 3) for which they
claim additivity: for their five increas-
ing saturation levels of 0.2, 0.4, 0.6,
0.8, and 1.0, the RT differences between
incongruent and neutral conditions are
1.77, 1.10, 1.00, 1.12, and 1.47; those
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between neutral and congruent condi-
tions are 2.15, 1.25, 1.04, 1.00, 1.04;
both in arbitrary units. Given additivity,
the differences in each set would all be
equal.
IS S&G’s “ONE-STAGE” MODEL
PLAUSIBLE?
The single-process model for which S&G
claim additive effects has “locked inputs”:
to the extent that low saturation delays
color discrimination it also delays word
recognition. (S&G conclude that their
models with unlocked inputs cannot pro-
duce the desired additivity). Because the
time to recognize the word probably
depends primarily on its luminance con-
trast (which was fixed) rather than its
color saturation, a model with “locked
inputs” seems implausible. Moreover, sup-
port for the idea that recognition of the
word is not influenced by saturation is
provided by the similarity of these data
to the results of experiment 2 in Stafford
et al. (2011), in which a white word was
displayed at a different location from a
patch whose color was named. If satu-
ration had influenced the recognition of
words in experiment 1, the results of
the two experiments should have differed
more.
MORE ON AFM REASONING
Others have expressed different mis-
conceptions about the “logic” of the
AFM and the nature of stage models.
According to Van Zandt and Ratcliff
(1995), “The use of additive mean RT’s
as support for a serial arrangement
of subprocesses depends heavily on the
assumption of selective influence . . .” (p.
34). Instead, the prediction of additiv-
ity should be thought of as depending
on a two-part hypothesis: stages (serial-
ity), and selective influence. Observation
of additivity supports both parts, just as
confirmation of a prediction from any
theory supports that theory. Independent
evidence for selective influence is not
required.
WHAT IS A STAGE MODEL?
One misconception about the kinds of
models to which the AFM is relevant
is perhaps due to confusion between
flow-charts (with units that are sub-
processES and arrows that indicate
successiveness), and block diagrams
(with units that are processORS and
arrows that indicate information trans-
fer). Broadbent (1984) and Coltheart
(2011) have argued that a process whose
subprocesses are organized in stages can-
not involve feedback because it must be
implemented by a “pipeline”: an ordered
set of processors through which infor-
mation passes in a fixed direction from
input to output. They seem to misin-
terpret the boxes in diagrams of stage
models as spatially arranged proces-
sORS, rather than temporally arranged
processES.
Stage models partition processing
operations into temporally successive
(and functionally distinct) components.
Nothing prevents a later stage from using
added information (feedback) to re-
process evidence that was extracted earlier.
For example, in reading a word, the initial
perception of a letter might be revised,
based on contextual letters; the revision
process could be a processING stage in
which a letter-perception processOR is
re-used. Also, not all stages require stim-
ulus representations provided by earlier
stages as input: consider the serial oper-
ations that may underlie visual search
for a feature conjunction, in which each
comparison between the target and a dis-
played item can be thought of as a stage.
For the distinction among three kinds of
stage (completion-controlled, outcome-
contingent, and data-dependent), see
Sternberg (1984). Neurophysiological
evidence for data-dependent stages is
discussed by Schall (2003), Woodman
et al. (2008), Schall et al. (2011), and
Sternberg (2011, Section 3.2), and ref-
erences therein. Neurophysiological
evidence for completion-controlled stages
is provided by Sigman and Dehaene
(2008).
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